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The EU as a coherent (cyber)security actor? 
 
Helena Carrapico and André Barrinha1 
 
The last three decades have seen the development of the European Union (EU) as a security 
actor. The transnational character of the security threats and the challenges identified by the EU 
have led to the progressive integration between internal and external security concerns. These 
concerns have often led to calls for greater coherence within EU security policies. The literature, 
however, indicates that this need for coherence has, so far, not been systematically 
operationalised, leading to a fragmented security field. This article has two main aims: to devise 
a framework for the analysis of the EU’s coherence as a security actor, and to apply it to the 
cybersecurity field. By focusing on EU cybersecurity policy, this article will explore whether the 
EU can be considered a coherent actor in this field or whether this policy is being implemented 
according to different and uncoordinated rationales.  
 
 
Introduction 
 
The European Union (EU) is an intricate security actor, covering an increasing number of areas 
and policies, ranging from the environment to cyberspace. A characteristic trait of this 
complexification has been the emphasis put by the EU on the merging of internal and external 
security and on the need to develop policies, actors and instruments that are coherent within this 
security context (Bossong and Rhinard, 2013). As acknowledged by former European 
                                               
1 The authors would like to thank the reviewers for their excellent comments, as well as the interviewees who made 
this article possible. They would also like to thank the Aston Centre for Europe and the RIEF funding 2016/2017 
from Canterbury Christ Church University (QR funding for Politics and International Relations) for supporting their 
fieldwork through financial support.   
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Commissioner for Justice, Freedom and Security, Jacques Barrot, "Justice and Home Affairs 
(JHA) policies have increasingly had an impact on international relations and play a vital role in 
the European Union’s (EU) external policies. Conversely, many of Europe’s internal policy goals 
depend on the effective use of external policy strategies" (2009, p. 11). More recently, the EU 
Global Strategy also refers to the need for further integration between internal and external 
security: “In security terms, terrorism, hybrid threats and organised crime know no borders. This 
calls for tighter institutional links between our external action and the internal area of freedom, 
security and justice” (2016, p.50).  However, as the degree of complexity in the EU’s security 
increases, questions should be asked regarding the coherence underlining the combination of 
what is now a large plethora of instruments, actors and policies. The EU may be becoming an 
increasingly complex security actor, but is it becoming a more coherent one, as it purports to be?  
 
This is a particularly relevant question when considering cybersecurity (Wessel, 2015). 
Recognising that information technology has become the backbone of European societies 
(European Parliament and Council, 2016), the EU has made cybersecurity one of its main 
security priorities. Such prioritisation has reflected itself not only at the level of new initiatives 
being proposed, but also in the idea that in order for the EU to be an effective cybersecurity actor 
it needs to be fully coherent. Cybersecurity questions a number of important dichotomies 
(internal/external, public/private, civilian/military) while, simultaneously, blurring the 
geographical distinctions between national, European and global levels (Kirchner and Speling, 
2007). As a security area, it provides an ideal ground to assess the coherence of the EU’s security 
actorness. On this basis, the present article proposes to investigate whether the EU is becoming a 
more coherent security actor in cyberspace. Specifically, the article aims at contributing to two 
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main bodies of literature: one on coherence and one on cybersecurity. Where the first is 
concerned, the article offers an innovative case study that points out that numerous coherence 
problems observed in other areas of security have spilled over to cybersecurity. Discussing 
coherence in this policy context implies focusing on the policies and institutions that sustain the 
EU’s cybersecurity approach and contrasting them against the underlying security 
understandings within which they are framed. Although cybersecurity as a unified domain is still 
a recent field of action for the EU (the EU’s first strategy in this area only dates to 2013), the 
article argues that it is possible to trace a search for coherence in this field prior to that point. 
Regarding the contribution to cybersecurity, the article proposes to add to this literature by 
offering conceptual tools to assess the EU’s activities in this field from a coherence-base 
perspective. This mapping exercise will allow for the progressive assessment of the EU’s 
developments in this field, by matching its practices against its official rhetoric and policy 
objectives.  
 
In terms of structure, the article is divided into three sections. The first one explores how the 
concept of coherence has gradually been integrated into EU security policies and presents an 
analytical framework, which focuses on the institutional practices and shared security 
understandings along two axes: vertical relations (between member states, European institutions 
and private actors) and horizontal relations (within member states, European institutions and 
private actors). The second section introduces the EU’s rhetoric on the importance of 
cybersecurity and of achieving coherence in this policy area. The third section applies the 
analytical framework to cybersecurity and contrasts the EU’s practices of coherence with its 
rhetoric. It suggests that significant obstacles to a fully coherent policy approach are still visible 
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both in terms of horizontal and vertical relations. The article concludes by offering a few 
normative reflections on the EU’s coherence as a cybersecurity actor.  
 
 
I. Conceptual Reflections on Coherence as a key Organisational Principle of the EU 
 
Coherence has long been a topic of policy and academic discussion, reflecting the positioning of 
this concept at the heart of the construction of the European project (Pomorska and 
Vanhoonacker, 2016; Cremona, 2008). Since the 1990s, the focus of this literature has been on 
the association of coherence with efficiency and on how best to achieve it, namely through the 
identification of areas suffering from capability-expectations gaps (Hill, 1993). Although the 
concepts of coherence and consistency have been abundantly explored in the academic literature, 
in particular the legal one (Van Vooren, 2012; Cremona, 2008), this article has chosen not to 
embark on a definitional discussion, but rather adopt the conceptualisation used by the EU. The 
reason for this choice is determined by the purpose of this article, which is to explore whether the 
EU is becoming a more coherent cyber security actor, according to its own proposed coherence 
objectives. In the European Security literature, this coherence is debated along the lines of 
whether the Foreign and Security Policy and the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice can be 
seen as coherent, including coherence within each individual policy area (Trauner, 2011; 
Missiroli, 2001) and across the different security policy areas (Pawlak, 2009).  
 
For the purposes of this article, and having the European Commission documents as a guiding 
reference, we propose to adopt a dual definition of coherence as institutional coordination and as 
shared understanding of security (2014; 2006).  The institutional coordination focuses on two 
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elements: operational and political, i.e. the concrete practices of the actors involved in the 
cooperative efforts (or absence of) on the one hand, and the political obstacles and incentives 
framing those relations, on the other. For these relations to be solid and fully coherent, they 
should be based on similar views about security, threats and potential responses between those 
same actors, which corresponds to the second coherence dimension considered in this article. 
 
As the external and internal dimensions of security became more relevant within the EU 
framework, so did the perception of their increased blurring (Davis Cross, 2013; Trauner and 
Carrapico, 2012; Bigo, 2000). The emergence of a post-Cold War security environment led to 
the replacement of nuclear deterrence with the prospect of new non-state security threats, such as 
organised crime and terrorism (Tickner, 1995). In Europe, new transnational solutions, better 
adapted to these emerging threats and coherently articulating the EU’s security actorness, had to 
be devised. Although there had been references to coherence since the early 1970s (Juncos, 
2013), it is in the post-Cold War context that the concept of coherence starts to permeate EU 
discourse in a clearer way.  
  
This shift in security priorities reflects a larger trend in the development of the EU legal order, in 
which coherence has gradually become one of the main constitutional principles (Cremona, 
2008). The Maastricht Treaty, for example, was explicit about this goal: “The Union shall in 
particular ensure the consistency of its external activities as a whole in the context of its external 
relations, security, economic and development policies” (Art. C). Since then, the importance of 
developing and strengthening a coherent approach to European security has continued to expand 
(Commission, 2014, 2006; European Council, 1999). As a recent example, the European Agenda 
on Security stressed that “EU internal security and global security are mutually dependent and 
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interlinked. The EU response must therefore be comprehensive and based on a coherent set of 
actions combining the internal and external dimensions” (Commission, 2015, p. 4). The Joint 
Framework on countering hybrid threats: a European Union response, presented in 2016, 
follows the same line when it promotes “a holistic approach that will enable the EU, in 
coordination with member States, to specifically counter threats of a hybrid nature by creating 
synergies between all relevant instruments and fostering close cooperation between all relevant 
actors” (2016, p. 3). As mentioned above, the same logic has now been replicated in the recently 
launched Global Strategy (2016). 
 
The concept of ‘coherence’ is, in our view, currently at the heart of the EU’s security actorness 
and strategic vision and it has been used to further justify institutional reform. It is the case, for 
instance, of the creation of the High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy, aimed at 
increasing coherence between EU institutions (Juncos, 2013). However, and despite having 
attracted substantial policy and academic attention, this is a concept that remains rather fuzzy 
and problematic.  
 
Incoherent coherence? 
 
For the European Commission, coherence should be equated with ‘better strategic planning’, 
‘better delivery and impact’ and ‘better co-operation’ (2006, pp. 6- 9). The European Security 
Strategy mentions that coherence is about “bringing together different instruments and 
capabilities’, ‘better coordination’ and ‘unity of command’” (2003, p. 13). Despite some degree 
of specification, however, the concept of coherence remains considerably vague. A good 
7 
example of this fuzziness is the EU’s interchangeable use of coherence and consistency, as 
explored in Missiroli’s work. In his view, the usage of different terms is significant as, legally, 
consistency is defined as the “absence of contradiction”, whereas coherence implies “an added 
value” (2001, p. 4). Politically, however, as the author concludes, such distinction is less relevant 
as “[b]oth terms hint at the need for coordinated policies with the goal of ensuring that the EU 
acts unitarily” (2001, p.4). The expectation is that by acting in a coordinated fashion, the EU will 
be a stronger actor. Despite having taken some important steps in that direction in the last few 
years, there is still, we argue, an important gap between rhetoric and practices between the EU’s 
aspired role as a unified security actor and the developments carried out for that purpose 
(Argomaniz, 2009).  
 
As mentioned in the introduction, assessing the EU’s coherence in this field entails looking at 
both its institutional coordination and the existence (or not) of shared views on security, threats 
and potential responses. In table 1, each of these conceptualisations is analysed along a 
horizontal and a vertical axis (Nuttall 2005). The horizontal one includes the elimination of 
contradictions in terms of policies, agency and instruments, at EU level, as well as between 
member states and private actors, whereas the vertical axis explores the coordination between 
actors from a multilevel perspective (Biscop and Andersson, 2008).  
 
 [please insert table 1 here] 
 
Coherence as institutional coordination should be understood as the optimal alignment of 
procedures, policy outputs, instruments and actors, necessary to tackle security threats that are 
not bound by national borders (Brattberg and Rhinard, 2012). According to the academic 
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literature (Wessel, 2015; Trauner, 2011), there is considerable indication that the proposed 
increase in coherence has not yielded the expected results in terms of coordination, leading to a  
capability-expectations gap (Hill, 1993). On the one hand, the EU has made considerable 
progress in terms of promoting common policy outputs, implementing new procedures to 
develop common instruments and encouraging security actors to work together2. On the other 
hand, however, issues of inter-institution and inter-agency conflict, overlap and lack of 
communication are said to be particularly worrying3.  
 
Coherence as shared understanding of security threats, implies looking at how different actors 
both vertically and horizontally define security as a concept and identify both the threats and 
ideal policy responses to best address them. In this area, clear progress in member states’ 
convergence towards a number of security-related concepts (Calderoni, 2010), such as 
‘transnational organised crime group’, ‘human trafficking’ or ‘terrorism’ has been reported. 
Despite these developments, authors such as Trauner (2011), have pointed out discrepancies in 
terms of how European values are applied in the context of the convergence between internal and 
external security. Although the EU argues that it is highly committed to the upholding of 
democracy, rule of law and fundamental rights, it is not unusual to observe the EU cooperating 
                                               
2 The streamlining of internal procedures has been accelerated through the elimination of the pillar system and the 
replacement of unanimity voting with qualified majority voting in Justice and Home Affairs (Treaty of Lisbon, 
2009). In addition, integrated security approaches have been promoted through the co-production of joint 
instruments, such as the Cyber Security Strategy (2013). 
3 Referring to Civilian Crisis Management and to the division of labour between the Commission and the Council, 
Howorth highlights that the CSDP “missions embarked on to date have all revealed serious problems of inter-agency 
rivalry” (2007, p. 132). 
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with countries that do not share the same respect for these values4. If we focus specifically on the 
issue of convergence towards common threat understandings at national level, considerable 
differences have also been identified among national definitions (Calderoni, 2010).  
 
The first section of this article proposed a conceptual mapping to analyse the level of coherence 
in EU security. The following section will now provide a detailed insight into the case study of 
cybersecurity, not only by exploring the origins and development of this policy field, but 
especially by focusing on the rhetoric of a policy field that is considered to represent one of the 
main successes in security coherence (European Commission, 2014). The mapping of the EU’s 
rhetorical construction of its cyber security policy will then serve as a comparative basis for the 
third section and draw conclusions regarding the level of coherence of the area.  
 
II. EU Cybersecurity as a Coherent Policy Field?  
 
Cybersecurity is a broad term that covers occurrences and risks of different nature, from 
cybercrime and cyber-attacks to critical infrastructure and personal data protection (Klimburg 
and Tirmaa-Klaar, 2011). An indirect concern of the EU since the early 1990s (Porcedda, 2011), 
the origins of this policy can be found in the area of information and computer security, which 
later expanded to a comprehensive cybersecurity policy encompassing not only cybercrime but 
also critical information infrastructure protection and more recently cyber defence. According to 
the 1993 White Paper on Growth, Competitiveness and Employment and the 1994 Bangemann 
                                               
4 For instance, the EU external border agency, FRONTEX, has coordinated operations where the EU intercepted 
suspected illegal migrants and handed them over to third countries, including to authoritarian regimes such as 
Qaddafi’s Libya (Frontex, 2007).  
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report, information and communication technologies were seen as essential to the continued 
development of economies and the completion of the single market (European Commission; 
European Council). Both these documents already contained the idea that information and 
communication technologies would only benefit the economy if they were coherently articulated 
and integrated with older sectors of activity. The EU’s interest for cybersecurity thus started off 
as an economic concern, which was related to the advancement of the Single Market, and whose 
association to a coherent economic policy appears from an early stage.  
 
The addition of a security rationale to the already existing economic one occurred towards the 
end of the 1990s, driven by the international community’s interest for computer- related crime 
(Commission, 2001). The development of this security rationale also reflected itself within the 
EU’s rhetoric, which was by then particularly worried about illegal and harmful content on the 
Internet, as well as rapidly growing high-technology crime (Council, 1997). From the late 1990s 
to the mid- 2000s, a flurry of non- legally binding instruments and initiatives emerged in this 
area, aimed at fostering member state awareness and shared concern. Examples of such 
instruments include the introduction of the term high tech crime in Council conclusions for the 
first time in 1999 (Council, 1999); the eEurope 2002 action plan, which focused on fostering a 
more secure Internet in order to create the most dynamic knowledge- based economy in the 
world (Council, 2000); and the 2000 Commission Communication on improving the security of 
Information Infrastructures and combating computer-related Crime (Mendez, 2005). Similarly to 
the international shift, the idea of coherence also moved in the direction of increased cooperation 
at EU level.  
 
Notwithstanding the above-mentioned evolution, cybersecurity did not become a top security 
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priority until the mid-2000s (even the 2003 European Security Strategy was notably silent on the 
topic). The change emerged with the growing realisation that information systems and 
technologies were vulnerable to external attacks, particularly of a terrorist nature (European 
Commission, 2004). This shift led to two main outcomes: 1) the move from non- legally binding 
to legally binding instruments, as was the case of the 2005 Council Framework Decision on 
Attacks against Information Systems; and 2) the further reinforcement of the idea of coherence as 
a necessary element of efficiency and as a desirable result best achieved by the EU level. Both 
outcomes were connected by the perception that organised crime and terrorism represented a 
clear threat to the achievement of a safer information society, which was being put at risk by the 
existence of gaps and differences, and indeed gaps, between member states’ laws. The national 
level was presented as being insufficiently equipped to adequately answer to these increasingly 
transnational threats and a common approach, characterised by approximation and developed at 
EU level was, instead, introduced as a necessary response (Council, 2005).     
 
 Since then, there has been a clear effort to consolidate the EU’s activities in the field, namely by 
raising public awareness, by investing in a comprehensive and coherent strategy and 
corresponding instruments, such as the recently approved NIS Directive. As the second part of 
this section will demonstrate, the EU’s consolidation efforts have been focused on the three main 
pillars of this policy’s institutional architecture: cybercrime, critical information infrastructure 
protection (CIIP) and, to a lesser extent, cyber defence.  
 
Consolidating a coherent EU cybersecurity policy 
  
There has been a concerted attempt within the EU to promote coherence throughout the field. 
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The publication of the 2013 EU Cyber Security Strategy (EU-CSS) is particularly representative 
of the push towards increased coherence, as it resulted from a combined effort between then 
Home Commissioner Cecilia Malmström, High-Representative Catherine Ashton and DG 
Connect Commissioner Neelie Kroes, with the input of DG JUST (Fahey, 2014). The EU-CSS 
rests on three main action pillars – critical information infrastructure protection, cybercrime, and 
cyber defence (European Commission and HREU, 2013). The creation of the strategy aimed at 
improving the coordination between these three dimensions, which gradually came to be 
included in the area of cybersecurity but were still regarded as fairly separate (Christou, 2016). 
Critical information infrastructures correspond to physical and information technology facilities 
or services that are essential to society (health services, water and energy networks, 
telecommunications, banking), which, if disrupted, could seriously affect the wellbeing of 
citizens (Dunn Cavelty and Kristensen, 2008). Cybercrime refers to a large set of different 
criminal activities where computers and information systems constitute either the primary tool of 
the attack or their main target (Commission, 2007). Finally, cyber defence covers the 
safeguarding of the communication and information systems at the basis of national defence 
mechanisms (European Commission and HREU, 2013).  
 
As previously mentioned, coherence in the EU’s security approach can be divided into two broad 
categories: 1) Institutional cooperation and 2) Shared understanding of security. Where the first 
is concerned, considerable rhetorical emphasis is being put on the development of a common 
approach to cybersecurity based on the enhancement of cooperation among actors, instruments 
and policies (European Commission and HREU, 2013). Institutional cooperation is understood 
as being particularly important given that the European governance of cybersecurity is rather 
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decentralised, with relevant bodies to be found in the public and private sectors. In addition to 
national cybersecurity authorities and international bodies such as the Council of Europe, the 
main actors in cybersecurity include: DG Migration and Home Affairs (cybercrime), the 
European Cybercrime Centre (EC3) (cybercrime), the European External Action Service (cyber 
defence), the European Defence Agency (EDA) (cyber defence), DG for Communications 
Networks, Content and Technology (network and information security), the European Network 
and Information Security Agency (ENISA) (network and information security) and Computer 
Emergency Response Teams (CERTs) (cybercrime).  
 
Cooperation with the private sector is also understood as essential, as companies are considered 
to have a better insight into the practices of cybercrime (either as victims or as producers of anti- 
cybercrime products), and critical information infrastructures are often in the hands of the private 
sector (European Commission and HREU, 2013). In order to reinforce the need for intra-actor 
coherence, a Cooperation Group has been proposed by the Directive on security of network and 
information systems (NIS Directive) that entered into force in August 2016 (Directive (EU) 
2016/1148). Similar trends can be observed regarding instruments and policies. Considerable 
emphasis has been put on harmonising member states’ capabilities and infrastructures, and on 
ensuring a minimum level of requirements among private sector actors to allow cooperation to 
take place from a technical point of view (Directive (EU) 2016/1148). There is also a clear 
interest in ensuring that cybersecurity is being mainstreamed into larger policy areas, namely EU 
external relations and Common Foreign Security Policy (European Commission and HREU, 
2013). Cybersecurity has recently been framed as a priority area in the EU Global Strategy 
(2016). 
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Coherence as shared understanding of security is directly connected with the perceived need for 
a EU-wide approach to cybersecurity: “attacks against private or government IT systems in EU 
member States have given [cybersecurity] a new dimension, as a potential new economic, 
political and military weapon” (Council, 2008, p. 5). This need for a more common approach 
implies the encouragement of a holistic effort by all stakeholders, including international 
partners, the private sector and civil society (European Commission and HREU, 2013). There is 
the clear perception that cyber insecurity cannot be controlled directly by state institutions and 
therefore requires the full collaboration of the different sectors of society. Security is understood 
in this context as collaborative, preventive and resilient. Furthermore, it is also an understanding 
of security that is intimately tied with the promotion of EU values and principles: “Cyber 
security can only be sound and effective if it is based on fundamental rights and freedoms as 
enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and EU core values” 
(European Commission and HREU, 2013, p.4). This issue has been rather salient with regard to 
the post-Snowden relations between the EU and the United States where divergences between 
both – particularly regarding privacy and data protection – have been visible regarding the 
fundamental norms that underpin governance in cyberspace (Bendiek, 2014; Christou, 2016). 
 
 
III. From Rhetoric to Practices 
 
Following this analysis of the EU’s cybersecurity rhetoric, this article will now more thoroughly 
assess whether the EU can be considered a coherent actor in this field. The analysis will proceed 
by first exploring the differences between rhetoric and practices within the horizontal axis (inter- 
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institutional relations at the different EU, national and private levels), and then within the vertical 
axis (relations between member states and the EU, and between these actors and the private 
sector).  
 
 [please insert table 2 here] 
 
 
Horizontal Relations 
 
Europe, the EU included, has been witnessing a shift towards a greater awareness of the 
importance of cybersecurity and the need to mainstream it into all areas. Interviews conducted 
with EU and national officials in Brussels have confirmed the growing centrality of 
cybersecurity in policy discussions. The EU Global Strategy was unambiguous about it: “The EU 
will be a forward-looking cyber player, protecting our critical assets and values in the digital 
world” (2016, p.42). However, the interviews also revealed that despite these important steps, 
much remains to be done to achieve coherence in this area. As a security field, and when 
compared with other major cybersecurity players, the EU’s actorness in cyberspace is still rather 
limited (Christou, 2016) and it faces multiple challenges, including inter-institutional 
coordination and other factors that limit its operational capacity, such as financial investment and 
human resources. When making the distinction between operational institutional cooperation and 
political cooperation, the former is presented as less problematic and having progressed quicker 
whereas the latter seems to have remained a more sensitive area (interview, CERT EU, 2016). 
Let us look at the different levels of the horizontal analysis to better unpack these differences. 
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As mentioned above, cybersecurity is now a policy priority for EU institutions (Kroes 2012b, p. 
3). Present and future measures in the European security field will prioritise cyberspace, as made 
clear in the EU-CSS (2013), in the December 2013 European Council Conclusions, the 
European Agenda on Security (2015), the Joint Framework on countering hybrid threats: a 
European Union response (2016) and the EU Global Strategy (2016). In fact, the EU 
institutional architecture has developed considerably since 2004, with the creation of specialised 
agencies, such as ENISA and Europol’s EC3, as well as coordination mechanisms such as the 
Horizontal Working Party on Cyber Issues, specifically created to offer additional coordination 
between member states. The latter has succeeded the Friends of the Presidency Group on Cyber 
Issues and is responsible for bringing a large range of cyber related topics to the attention of 
COREPER and the Council in order to ensure coherence between areas as different as criminal 
justice in cyberspace and cyberdiplomacy (Council, 2016). There is now a much clearer idea of 
who the key stakeholders in the field are and where the need for greater coherence lies 
(interview, German Permanent Representation, 2016). The NIS Directive (European Parliament 
and Council, 2016) appears to further contribute to this by bringing together the European 
Commission, member states and ENISA as members of the new Cooperation Group, which has 
been created to offer strategic guidance and facilitate cooperation between member states on 
information security.  
 
Bendiek refers to this progress when she mentions that “this cooperation finds expression in the 
joint meetings of the Political and Security Committee (PSC) and the Committee on Operational 
Cooperation on Internal Security (COSI), as well as in the joint sessions of the Parliamentary 
Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) and the Committee on Foreign 
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Affairs (AFET)” (2012, p. 20). It is also embodied in the mutual representation of ENISA in the 
EC3 board and vice-versa. The two agencies signed a cooperation agreement in 2014 that 
contributed to a higher level of coordination between them. More recently, they have been 
developing a common taxonomy for practitioners to refer to cyber incidents, a common format 
for relevant information and a mechanism for information exchange (ENISA, 2015b). EEAS 
representatives also sit on the board of EC3. In fact, interviews conducted by the authors in 2015 
and 2016 reveal an emerging ‘cybersecurity community’ across EU institutions that is based 
upon a culture of communication, coordination and the acknowledgment of limited resources 
(interview, EEAS, 2015; interview, Commission, 2016).  
 
The attempt to increase coordination has not, however, always resulted in coherent inter-
institutional work. On the contrary, the EU’s approach to cyberspace continues to be fragmented, 
(Klimburg and Tirmaa-Klaar, 2011; Christou, 2016), and possesses characteristics of an 
emerging policy field with a “lack of clearly delineated areas of responsibility and accountability 
among the different institutions” (Bendiek, 2012, p. 12). There are coordination problems 
between, but also within institutions, which are related to the historical evolution of the different 
cybersecurity areas, as well as the perception that each area still experiences different separate 
challenges. It is not unusual to find projects whose objectives clash with those of other 
institutions (interview, European Parliament, 2016). Furthermore, states, via the Council, seem to 
be more reluctant than other institutions (such as the European Parliament) to enhance EU 
powers in this area (interview, CERT EU, 2016).   
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As a consequence, the allocated resources are often extremely low when compared with other 
security areas and other parts of the world. For instance, in 2013 the Pentagon requested USD 
3.2 billion worth of funding be allocated to cybersecurity (Comninos, 2013). Comparatively, the 
EU’s network and information security agency, ENISA, has an annual budget of €11 million 
(ENISA, 2016), the European Cybercrime Centre, EC3, had an initial budget of €7 million (BBC 
News, 2013), and until recently the European External Action Service (EEAS) had only four 
people working on cybersecurity (Renard, 2014b, p. 14).  
 
Regarding the level of coherence at the national level, the problems are similar, although more 
acute. Cybersecurity is regarded, on the one hand, as a sensitive area where the sharing of 
information does not come naturally to all member states, and on the other hand as an emerging 
area which is new to many countries (an idea consensually shared by all the stakeholders 
interviewed in Brussels for this article). Whereas member states such as France, Germany, the 
Netherlands and Italy would like to go further than the current EU cybersecurity framework, 
other countries prefer forms of sub- regional cooperation. One such example is the Visegrad 
countries plus Austria, who created the Central European Cyber Security Platform (CSCSP) that 
promotes cooperation between their respective CERTs and Computer Security and Incident 
Response Teams (CSIRTs) (interview, CERT EU, 2016). The problem of differing priorities 
does not lie only in political preferences but also in security capabilities, including the necessary 
institutional framework to exchange information with other countries and the capacity to conduct 
cybercrime and cyber defence operations. Where the first is concerned, there is still no 
agreement regarding the most appropriate model for the collection and sharing of information 
between member states (interview, European Parliament, 2016). There is also the issue that 
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national authorities have different models of cybersecurity coordination at national level, which 
further complicates the choice of a model for information exchange (Christou, 2016; Guitton, 
2013). Furthermore, not all countries are ready to make the financial commitment that is 
involved in creating the necessary infrastructure and as a result tend to not prioritise 
cybersecurity (interview, European Parliament, 2016). This difference in capabilities and 
prioritisation is particularly visible in the number of existing national cybersecurity strategies 
among EU member states, which in 2016 was still limited to 23 (ENISA, 2016). The NIS 
Directive recognises these discrepancies between member states, suggesting that this “results in 
an unequal level of protection of consumers and businesses, and undermines the overall level of 
security of network and information systems within the Union” (European Parliament and 
Council, 2016, p. 2).   
 
Regarding the level of private actors, we can also identify similar coherence problems. As 
mentioned previously, the private sector plays a central role in this security area: it acts as an 
agenda setter – as it raises awareness of specific trends – and as a partner to EU institutions and 
member states (interview, European Parliament, 2016). The fulfilment of this role also implies a 
considerable amount of intra-sector cooperation. In particular, ENISA feels that it is extremely 
important for different sectors of the economy to collaborate on the development and adoption of 
security standards in order to better protect consumers, the Digital Single Market and the 
industries themselves from cyber-attacks (2015a). However, there is indication that the level of 
coordination among companies and levels of cybersecurity maturity vary considerably depending 
on the sector of activity. Whereas the financial sector is more open to cooperation, the 
telecommunications one is more hesitant (interview, Commission, 2016). The hesitation can in 
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part be explained by the fear that information exchange could result in the eroding of a 
competitive edge (interview, European Parliament, 2016; Giacomello, 2014).  
 
Vertical Relations 
 
When asked about the coherence between the EU, national and private actors levels, most of the 
interviewees agreed that we have witnessed an increase in coherence, linked to the 
Europeanisation of national approaches to cybersecurity. The Europeanisation has become 
visible in the greater awareness of cybersecurity issues and in gradual development of 
cybersecurity standards. This trend is particularly linked to three main elements: 1) the 
perception that cybercrime is increasing; 2) the response to the massive usage of the Internet and 
digital services; 3) the reaction to international cyber-attacks and their impact on countries such 
as Estonia and The Netherlands (interview, German Permanent Representation, 2016). Despite 
growing Europeanisation, cybersecurity in Europe “remains almost exclusively a national 
prerogative” (Renard, 2014a, p. 13). This point is particularly relevant, given the EU’s claim, as 
seen above, that cybersecurity is too complex and too transnational in nature to be left to member 
states. In 2012, officials from the European Commission publicly criticised the low level of 
preparedness of a considerable number of member states (Nielsen, 2012). The problems of 
coordination that were described above among member states also reflect themselves in the 
cooperation between member states and EU institutions. Brussels often has difficulty convincing 
member states of the importance of furthering integration in this area, often resorting to projects 
‘á la carte’ where national participation is voluntary as is the case of EDA projects. The problem, 
however, is not stemming only from the national level. The Network and Information Directive  
is a specific example which could lead to coordination problems and a lack of coherence, 
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particularly regarding the division between network information infrastructure bodies and law 
enforcement ones, as  EC3 plays a very limited role in the directive (Parliament and Council, 
2016: 9). 
 
In terms of cooperation between private and public actors, similar problems emerge. Although 
public private partnerships (PPPs) are widespread in this sector, their level of cooperation varies 
considerably and there is often a degree of uncertainty regarding what the partners can offer each 
other (interview conducted in Brussels, 2016). One of the problems, long identified, but not yet 
solved, is the existence of diverging interests where the private sector privileges efficiency and 
profit, and the public sector prioritises security (Dunn Cavelty, 2009). According to Bossong and 
Wagner (2016), this divergence in interests reflects itself well in the large multitude of ill-
defined forms of public-private cooperation in the area of cybersecurity. These authors show 
through a comparative study of many PPPs in this area that these forms of cooperation often 
remain at the rhetorical level because they have little to offer to the private side. As an example, 
an ENISA report from 2015 revealed that the main PPP led by this agency, the European Public 
Private Partnership for Resilience (E3PR), failed to produce meaningful results because of 
multiple conflicts of interests relating to the costs of mandatory security measures and of data 
confidentiality (2015c)5. This divergence eventually affects the level of trust between partners, 
which is essential for information sharing regarding the disclosure of cyber-attacks at national 
level. Finally, PPPs also have the problem of being too narrow and not taking into account the 
level of integration of specific markets (Dunn Cavelty, 2009): a PPP focusing on the protection 
                                               
5 In addition to E3PR, other PPP-related initiatives can also be found in the NIS Public- private Platform, which was 
proposed in the EU Cybersecurity Strategy of 2013. More recently, a contractual Public- private Partnership (cPPP) 
has also been signed in this area in July 2016 with the aim of structuring and coordinating digital security industries 
in the EU.  
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of electric grids might not consider the security of third party companies, which the electric grid 
relies on to produce energy.     
 
Overall, we could argue that there is a contradiction within the EU’s vertical axis of 
cybersecurity: on the one hand, it clearly highlights the limits of national approaches, both due to 
the transnational character of the threats and to the heterogeneous approach to the field, and, on 
the other hand, it promotes, in its strategy, “a decentralized organization, where cybersecurity 
governance remains in the MS, while the EU supports capacity building, ensures consistency 
across MS, and facilitates coordination and outreach” (Ramunno, 2014, p.1).  
 
Conclusion 
 
Our understanding of European security in 2016 is certainly less assertive than a decade ago, 
when authors such as Allen G. Sens argued that “[t]he EU will increasingly become the 
institutional centre of gravity for security policy deliberation, coordination and action by 
European governments” (2007, p. 25). However, even if such favourable view of the EU’s 
security actorness is far from being accomplished, one cannot deny that in areas, such as 
cybersecurity the EU is gradually becoming an important actor (Christou, 2016; Wessel, 2015). 
If to this we add the increasingly complexity of issues the EU needs to deal with (from border 
management to counter-terrorism), it becomes clear that a coherent EU might be necessary to 
tackle the multiple security issues that affect its citizens and members states. 
 
The mapping presented above allows for a structured approach to the issue of coherence in EU 
security, focusing both on the vertical relations between the EU, its member states and private 
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actors, and on the horizontal relations between its multiple institutions and agencies. Focusing on 
the specific case of cybersecurity, it was possible to conclude in this preliminary study, that the 
EU has an explicit ambition to be a coherent security actor. However, both the architecture put in 
place under the EU-CSS and the resistance from member states to allow the EU to have a more 
stringent control over their cyber activities, limit the EU’s coherence in the field. That said, both 
the rising political importance given to cybersecurity and the progressive consolidation of what 
is still a rather recent field of activity, means there are signs the EU might move towards a more 
coherent actorness in the field. 
 
We should, however, conclude this article on a cautionary note. When discussing the coherence 
of the EU as a security actor, there are a few normative assumptions that are, by default, 
associated with it. First, and foremost, the idea that it is better for the EU to act as a unitary actor, 
as that will mean a more ‘effective’ EU. This is an assumption that is far from self-evident, at 
least in the realm of foreign policy, where the EU “has often achieved unanimity at the expense 
of effectiveness”. Furthermore, “a policy can be effective without necessarily being consistent 
(as the ‘carrot-and stick’ metaphor and the good cop-bad cop’ example epitomise)” (Missiroli, 
2001, p. 5). Second, there is also the notion that a more coherent Union is, in the security field, a 
more integrated union where different policy areas coincide to offer the best possible toolkit of 
action. In such a case, security threats are presented in a spectrum where continuity, rather than 
difference, occupies central stage, but that ultimately, might encourage an exaggeration of 
connections between them” (Anderson, 2007, p. 43). Finally, the idea that  a more effective EU 
is ‘a good thing’ due to the values it portrays, as visible in the European Security Strategy: “An 
active and capable European Union would make an impact on a global scale. In doing so, it 
would contribute to an effective multilateral system leading to a fairer, safer and more united 
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world” (2003, p. 14). That might not always be the case. As alerted by Bendiek, “regulative 
strategies such as the planned EU strategy on cybersecurity cannot be measured only by their 
efficiency. Instead, they also have to fulfil the fundamental criteria of democratic governance: 
transparency, rule of law, accountability and participation.” (Bendiek, 2012, p. 26). Particularly 
in the field of cybersecurity, where decision-making “is characterised by a lack of transparency 
and accountability” (Bendiek, 2012, p. 24), it is fundamental that we understand that a coherent 
actor must also be coherent with the values it defends. 
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Table 1 - Coherence in the security field 
 
 
Horizontal Axis Vertical Axis 
Institutional 
coordination/integration Are member states’ security 
institutions/ bodies coordinating 
policies and instruments efficiently at 
national level?  
Are EU institutions coordinating 
initiatives efficiently at European 
level? 
Is there coordination between private 
companies in the area of security? 
Are member states and EU 
institutions coordinating 
effectively across security 
policies? 
Are European institutions 
gaining competences in the area 
of security? 
Is the private sector, as an 
emerging actor in European 
security, coordinating effectively 
with member states and EU 
institutions? 
Shared understandings 
Threats, approaches, 
responses 
Has there been an approximation or 
harmonization of national 
understandings of specific security 
threats? 
Do member states prioritise a European 
response to security issues? 
Do European institutions share the 
same understanding of security threats? 
Are threat responses framed within a 
similar conceptual framework? 
Does the private sector project a shared 
understanding of security threats? 
Are member states’ 
understandings of security 
threats similar to those of EU 
institutions? 
Do EU documents reflect 
national security 
understandings? 
Do member states apply at 
national level the security threat 
definitions used in EU 
documents? 
Does the private sector share the 
same understandings of security 
threats as the State sector? 
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Table 2 - Coherence in the cybersecurity field 
 
 Horizontal Axis Vertical Axis 
Institutional cooperation Growing culture of coordination 
between EU institutions, visible 
through increase in number of official 
documents referring to the need for 
closer coordination and through 
representation of EU bodies in 
management boards (namely EC3, 
ENISA and CERT EU). 
 
However, increased rhetorical 
coordination has not produced 
evidence of coordinated practices. 
 
Coherence is hindered by limited 
financial resources, low staff numbers 
and confusing division of labour. 
 
Lack of evidence of greater 
coordination among private actors 
through efficient self- regulation and 
the setting of benchmarks. 
 
There are clear problems of 
coordination between the EU level 
and the national one due to 
different levels of preparedness of 
member states. 
 
Cybersecurity governance remains 
the responsibility of member states.  
 
Fragmentation of the European 
approach through the creation of 
sub-regional partnerships. 
 
ENISA and EC3 are gaining new 
competences in the area of 
cybersecurity and their influence in 
shaping national policies has also 
increased.  
 
There is evidence of the 
willingness of the private sector to 
collaborate in cybersecurity 
governance, but results have so far 
been limited.  
Shared understandings 
Threats, approaches, 
responses 
Growing rhetoric on shared 
cybersecurity threats both at the EU 
and at national level through the 
production of official documents. 
 
However, member states’ commitment 
to a shared understanding of 
cybersecurity is not always clear. 
 
Lack of evidence regarding whether 
the private sector shares the same 
understanding of cyber threats. 
Prevention and preparedness practices 
show that not all companies share the 
same understanding of risk.  
member states have added 
responsibilities, given the central 
role they assume in Europe's 
cybersecurity architecture, but they, 
overall share the same threats and 
concerns. 
 
They do not, however, share the 
same responses, due to different 
levels of cybersecurity 
development and lack of trust.  
 
Only part of the private sector 
shares the EU and national 
concerns as responses continue to 
diverge considerably.  
 
 
